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Theory and in Practice, assessing the legality of third-State involvement in the internal and
external affairs of other States.
Prematurely calling time of death on ‘negative equality’?
On 5 and 6 December 2019, the Journal on the Use of Force and International Law
(JUFIL) and the Ghent Rolin-Jaequemyns International Law Institute (GRILI) hosted
an international conference on ‘military assistance on request’, the doctrine
formerly known as ‘intervention by invitation’. Also present at the conference were
several members of the refurbished International Law Association (ILA) Committee
on the Use of Force, co-chaired by Professors Claus Kreß and Vera Rusinova and
intent on  eshing out the many unresolved issues related to this intricate topic.
One leitmotif of the spirited conference proceedings (with resultant papers soon to be
published in two special issues of JUFIL) was profound scepticism towards the
doctrine of ‘negative equality’, which prescribes that ‘[t]hird States shall refrain from
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giving assistance to parties to a civil war which is being fought in the territory of
another State’. Few participants considered the doctrine as a representation of the
lex lata, echoing common criticism among legal commentators – including in the
blogosphere (see, for example, here, here and here). In a 2018 report, the ILA
Committee’s immediate predecessor also seems to have hedged its bets by opining
that while ‘consent can allow for the sending of armed forces into a State following
the request by its government for assistance in quelling an insurrection … [and] may
preclude a violation of the jus ad bellum, it cannot justify violations of the jus in bello or
international human rights law’.
It is therefore all the more surprising that the situation in Libya appears to belie this
negative trend for ‘negative equality’ as it features a ban on all foreign interference
and emphatic support for a Libyan-led, Libyan-owned process to end the con ict –
and thereby con rms the doctrine’s main tenets.
Foreign intervention  oods Libya
Arab Spring protests in 2011 against the dictatorial rule of long-time Libyan
strongman Colonel Muammar Qadha  set in motion a series of events, including a
UN-sanctioned military intervention, that plunged the country in a deep crisis that
continues to this day. The uprising devolved into a fully- edged civil war by May
2014 and (re-)intensi ed in April 2019, pitting the forces of General Khalifa Haftar –
at the head of the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) and backed by the eastern-
based House of Representatives (HoR) – against those loyal to the UN-recognized,
Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj.
While military support has been  owing to the various factions in Libya from the get-
go, notwithstanding an arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council since
2011, overt foreign intervention escalated with the surprise signature of two
Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) between the GNA and Turkey in November
2019. One of them pertained to military and security cooperation, and was (also)
relied upon by the Turkish government for sending at least one hundred military
of cers and thousands of Syrian  ghters from a Turkish-backed rebel group to
Libya, assisted by effective air support and deliveries of weapons and other military
equipment. Over the course of six months, the Turks tipped the scales squarely in
favour of the GNA – with a battle currently looming over the strategic coastal city of
Sirte.
Haftar’s foreign backers – including Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Russia and
France – were left scrambling to formulate a  rm response. That response came on
Saturday 20 June, when Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi boldly declared Sirte
and the inland al Jufra air base a red line, the crossing of which would trigger a
direct military (counter-)intervention. In the meantime, the Arab League has called
for an immediate cease re but also warned against a ‘continuation of military action
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for an immediate cease re, but also warned against a continuation of military action
that alters existing front lines’.
International justi cation and reaction
Following the unfortunate pattern evident in similar recent cases (such as those in
Yemen, Syria/Iraq and Mali), the States (considering) overtly intervening in the
armed con ict by sending troops under its command did not provide a clear and
determinate legal justi cation for such action, but rather offered a range of possible
mandates.
For example, Turkey relied on the aforementioned MoU (despite its terms not
seeming to apply), a GNA-issued request for assistance in line with UNSC Resolution
2259 (even though neither trump the arms embargo still in place), prior foreign
support to the ‘putschist’ Haftar, the  ght against international terrorism, protection
against illegal immigration and human traf cking, as well as the protection of
Turkish national interests (see here, here, here and here). Admittedly, Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also noted he wanted the ‘legitimate government in
Libya to remain standing’, clearly signalling a desire to determine the outcome of the
con ict.
Similarly, Egypt defended its envisioned military intervention as having
international legitimacy ‘either within the framework of the UN Charter (Right to
self-defense), or according to the only Libyan elected legitimate authority’ (a
reference to the HoR). At the same time, the intervention would aim at ‘[p]rotecting
and securing the western borders of the State … from the threats of terrorist militias
and mercenaries’ and ‘restoring security and stability in Libya as part and parcel of
Egypt’s security and stability’.
At  rst sight, both States thus rely on an invitation from their favoured governing
body in Libya – albeit as only one justi cation among many – which ostensibly  ies
in the face of a prohibition on military assistance to any party embroiled in a fully-
 edged civil war (as prescribed by ‘negative equality’). However, that image shifts
rather dramatically when considering the reaction of the broader community of
States.
Indeed, on 19 January 2020 all primary actors involved in the Libyan con ict –
including the major foreign backers of both parties, the permanent members of the
UN Security Council, the Arab League, African Union and European Union –
accepted the so-called Berlin Conference Conclusions. Four such conclusions
committed the signatories to accept that ‘[o]nly a Libyan-led and Libyan owned
political process can end the con ict and bring lasting peace’, to refrain from
‘interference in the armed con ict’ and ‘the  nancing of military capabilities or the
recruitment of mercenaries’ and to ‘fully respect and implement the arms embargo’.
8/4/2020 A Libyan Playground for Foreign Powers: Presenting the Case for ‘Negative Equality’ - Opinio Juris
opiniojuris.org/2020/06/26/a-libyan-playground-for-foreign-powers-presenting-the-case-for-negative-equality/#:~:text=Luca Ferro is a post,external… 4/5
The UN Security Council then endorsed these conclusions, equally underscoring the
importance of facilitating a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned inclusive political process
and explicitly demanding that all States refrain from intervening in the con ict and
comply with the arms embargo (UNSC Res 2510, preambular para 3, paras 2 and 11;
see also UNSC Res 2509). This led the Libyan representative in the ensuing debate to
exclaim:
Consequently, the of cial message by the international community of States
(con rmed time and again) on the situation in Libya was clear: States must refrain
from interfering (militarily) in the con ict on either side and let the Libyan people
themselves determine the way out of the crisis and into a new political future.
Regardless of whether this message was heeded in practice, it is as clear a
con rmation of ‘negative equality’ as one could imagine.
Concluding thoughts
This post did not intend to take up the defence of ‘negative equality’ on  political or
policy-oriented grounds, even if research tends to show that foreign interference
prolongs internal armed con icts with particularly devastating effects on the civilian
population. Rather, it proceeds from the legal understanding that certain armed
con icts may be viewed as the forcible implementation of a people’s internal right of
self-determination, triggering a ban on all third-party interference that is not strictly
humanitarian and/or sanctioned by the UN.
While none of that is admittedly borne out by contemporary practice in Libya, it does
 nd surprisingly broad support in of cial statements related to the con ict thereby
laying bare the hypocrisy of intervening States as well as the UN Security Council’s
unfortunate inability to ensure compliance with its arms embargo. As the legality of
‘military assistance on request’ is primarily determined by customary international
law, States’ opinio juris is crucial and, in this case,  rmly contradicts the common
refrain that a military intervention at the request of a sitting government is prima
facie allowable even if to quash an internal insurrection. International lawyers should
We welcome the con rmation by the Council that the only solution to the
Libyan crisis is a political one. … we hope to work together in order to bring
our views closer together and overcome any differences, with a view to
achieving full consensus as we saw at the Berlin Conference. That would free
Libyans from the international restrictions, leading to self-determination. As we
hear every single day, the solution should be a [sic] Libyan-led and Libyan-owned.
(emphasis added)
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thus call out Turkish and (threatened) Egyptian action for what it is: an unequivocal
breach of international law.
Luca Ferro
